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Abstract 
Flooding is New Zealand’s most frequent natural hazard the cost of which is 
outdone only by the recent Canterbury earthquakes. Local authorities are the 
bodies primarily tasked with protecting communities against flooding 
through a range of measures including physical works such as stopbanks.  
This essay explores the extent to which a local authority can be liable in tort 
where those physical works fail, causing damage. Direct liability and non-
delegable duties are discussed, the latter addressing whether a local 
authority can nevertheless be liable having outsourced the construction of 
flood works to independent contractors. Additionally, whether local 
authorities should be liable for such damage or whether individual property 
owners ought to protect their own interests through insurance is 
discussed.Tthis essay recommends that property owners should purchase 
private insurance, but that local authorities should remain liable at least for 
their own negligence. 
Keywords 
Flooding; tort; local authority liability; non-delegable duty.
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I Introduction 
Flooding is New Zealand’s most frequent natural hazard with climate 
change likely to increase both the intensity and frequency of major flooding 
events.1 On average a major flood occurs every eight months.2 
Compounding the effects, most towns and cities are situated near rivers, 
increasing flooding’s economic impact.3 
In February 2004 extreme weather caused catastrophic flooding to homes, 
farms, and businesses in the Bay of Plenty, Manawatu-Wanganui, and 
Marlborough regions. The storms caused an estimated $400 million in 
damage, $112 million of which was fronted by insurance pay-outs and a 
further $135 million in government aid for farmers.4 Approximately 2,600 
farmers were affected, some unable to continue farming the land after 
returning.5 Pay-outs for flood loses between 1976 and 2004 are estimated at 
$17 million and $15 million per annum from insurance companies and the 
government respectively.6 
More recently, the 2011 Canterbury earthquakes have caused rivers to 
become shallower and wider, making them more prone to flooding.7 Thus, 
many areas in Christchurch have experienced regular flooding as often as 
nine times in the space of just three years.8 As recently as July 2014, 
                                                            
1  See Mark Walton and others Economic impacts on New Zealand of climate 
change-related extreme events: Focus on freshwater floods (New Zealand Institute 
of Economic Research, July 2004). 
2  Ministry for the Environment Meeting the Challenges of Future Flooding in New 
Zealand (Ministry for the Environment and the Flood Risk Management and River 
Control Review Steering Group, August 2008) at 1. 
3  At v. 
4  Eileen McSaveney “Floods: 2004 floods” (21 February 2013) Te Ara: The 
Encyclopedia of New Zealand <www.teara.govt.nz/en/floods> at 5. 
5  At 5. 
6  Eileen McSaveney “Floods: New Zealand’s number 1 hazard” (21 February 2013) 
Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New Zealand <www.teara.govt.nz/en/floods> at 1. 
7  University of Canterbury “Christchurch experiences more floods” (5 March 2014) 
University of Canterbury: Communications 
<http://www.comsdev.canterbury.ac.nz/rss/news/?feed=news&articleId=1227>. 
8  The Press “Widower suffers ninth flood since quakes” (29 April 2014) Stuff 
<www.stuff.co.nz/national/9989139>. 
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torrential rain falling over two weeks in Northland caused extensive 
flooding affecting businesses and residents.9 
Numerous measures protect against flooding. These include weather 
forecasting, insurance, recovery plans, and the construction of physical 
works such as stopbanks and culverts. Responsibility for flood protection 
lies with local government: “The Government considers local risks to be a 
local responsibility”.10 Councils have extensive responsibility for managing 
flood risk. Flood protection measures are generally effective, but sometimes 
fail. Central government typically involves itself at the civil defence 
recovery stage only where necessary. In respect of physical works, money 
tends to be allocated by councils in respect of specific projects, rather than a 
single “flood protection” budget drawn from on an as-needs basis. For 
example, the Hutt City Council is currently planning to increase the height 
of the stop bank which protects the City from the Hutt River. This should be 
completed by 2022 with an allocated budget (including some other works) 
of $26 million. 
This essay explores the extent to which a local authority may be liable in 
tort for flood damage, addressing both direct liability and so called “non-
delegable” duties for the work of contractors. An analysis of whether 
councils should be liable is undertaken with a brief evaluation of current 
practices of insuring against loss for both homeowners and local authorities. 
This essay concludes that, while local authorities can be liable for flooding 
in some circumstances, it is preferable for homeowners to purchase private 
insurance rather than extend local authority liability further than the current 
state of the law. 
 
 
 
                                                            
9  Lynley Bilby “Torrential rain causes slips and power cuts” The New Zealand 
Herald (online ed, Auckland, 20 July 2014). 
10  National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2005, Part 10, cl 
89(2) promulgated under ss 39(1) and 45(b) of the Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Act 2002. 
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II Background 
A Statutory Framework: Who Is Responsible for What? 
Local government in New Zealand is made up of larger regional councils 
(RCs), and myriad smaller territorial authorities (TAs) servicing specific 
communities. Responsibility for managing flood risk is primarily vested in 
regional councils and territorial authorities – rather than central government 
– through a plethora of statutes, some over a century old. These statutes 
provide various tools. The two focused on in this essay are categorised as:11 
(1) hazard controls – for example stopbanks, culverts, and their 
maintenance;12 and 
(2) flood loss insurance.13 
1  Central government 
Central government plays a reduced role, focusing primarily on recovery.14 
However, the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) requires the Minister 
for the Environment to ensure the Act is effectively implemented.15 The 
Ministry for the Environment is required to provide advice to the 
government, its agencies, and other public authorities on “the identification 
and likelihood of natural hazards and reduction of the effects of natural 
hazards”.16 Despite this general duty to provide information no specific 
policy group or commission is tasked with guiding local government’s 
approach to flooding. 
Following 2005 RMA amendments the Minister has increased powers to 
address RMA issues. The Minister may investigate the performance of a 
local council,17 make recommendations,18 require the production of a 
                                                            
11  John McSweeny Overview of Flood Management Legislation in New Zealand 
(Ministry for the Environment, November 2006) at 12. 
12  Local Government Act 2002; Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941; 
Rivers Board Act 1908; and Land Drainage Act 1908. 
13  Earthquake Commission Act 1993. 
14  National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2005 Part 10, cl 
89(2). 
15  Resource Management Act 1991, s 24(f). 
16  Environment Act 1986, s 31(c)(iv). 
17  Resource Management Act 1991, s 27. 
18  Section 24A. 
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“regional plan” to address issues,19 and in extreme circumstances appoint 
someone to take control of the functions, duties, and responsibilities of the 
authority.20 
2  Regional and unitary councils 
Following the Local Government Reorganisation Order 1989, 14 new RCs 
were formed (now 11). Within those regions there are 67 TAs compring 12 
city councils, 54 district councils, and one Auckland Council.21 Six of these 
territories have the powers of both RCs and TAs, making them “unitary 
councils”. Flood protection tasks are shared between RCs and TAs. 
However, commentary indicates that a lack of legislative clarity has made it 
difficult to determine to whom any given task falls.22 The boundaries for 
RCs are partly determined on the basis of water catchment areas, while TAs 
are based on community interests. Consequently, RCs have a greater degree 
of responsibility in respect of flood planning. 
Under Schedule 10 of the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA), local 
authorities are required to produce “long-term plans”. Such a plan must be 
produced in respect of a range of a “group of activities”, one such “group” 
being “flood protection and control works”.23 This plan must detail inter alia 
how the plan is to be funded.24 Councils are also required to produce 
“regional policy statements” (RPSs).25 These seek to provide direction for 
resource management.  A RPS must state “objectives, policies, and 
methods” to “avoid or mitigate natural hazards or any group of hazards”.26 
Under the RMA regional and district “plans” must “give effect” to the 
RPS.27 These “regional plans” may be created to address any major resource 
management issue. 
                                                            
19  Section 25A(1)(a) 
20  Section 25. 
21  Some TAs overlap with more than one of the 11 regions. 
22  John McSweeny, above n 11, at 6. 
23  Local Government Act 2002, Schedule 10, cl 2(2)(d). 
24  Schedule 10, cl 3. 
25  Resource Management Act 1991, ss 59–63. 
26  Section 62(1)(i). 
27  Sections 67(3)(c) and 75(3)(c). 
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The RMA allows RCs to delegate or transfer a function, power, or duty to 
another “public authority” (including a local council).28 Authorities must 
continue to monitor the use of that delegated power.29 
The Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 (SCRCA) makes 
provision for “the prevention of damage by erosion” and to provide 
“protection of property from damage by floods.” The Act creates catchment 
boards and provides them with the power to “minimise and prevent damage 
within its district by flood erosion”,30 and the power to “construct, 
reconstruct, alter, repair, and maintain” necessary works.31  
The Public Works Act 1981 allows for the compulsory acquisition of private 
land for these works,32 for which compensation can be sought.33 The powers 
and responsibilities of “land drainage boards” constituted under the Local 
Government Act 1974 and Land Drainage Act 1908 are also vested in RCs. 
This includes the powers to construct and maintain drains and waterways.34 
The 1989 Order provided that certain “functions, powers, and duties” were 
vested in RCs. For example, the Local Government (Bay of Plenty Region) 
Reorganisation Order 1989 states that:35 
 The functions, duties, and powers of the Bay of Plenty Regional Council 
shall be: 
 … 
 (d) The functions, duties, and powers of a catchment board … under the 
Soil Conservation  and Rivers Control Act … 
There are similar provisions for each region. Any reference to a catchment 
board in reality means the relevant RC. 
 
                                                            
28  Sections 33 and 34. 
29  Section 35. 
30  Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941, s 126(1). 
31  Section 126(2). 
32  Section 28. 
33  Public Works Act 1981, Part 5. 
34  Land Drainage Act 1908, s 17. 
35  Local Government Reorganisation Order 1989, cl 16(d). 
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3  Territorial authorities 
TAs, like RCs, must ascertain policy and funding priorities in their long-
term plans through which the annual plan gives effect. This can be achieved 
through “district plans”, the purpose of which is to “assist territorial 
authorities to carry out their functions” to achieve the purposes of the 
RMA.36 At all times a district plan must be in place, prepared by the TA.37 
TAs have responsibility for managing large networks of urban and land 
drainage infrastructure.38 A TA may require private land owners to provide 
drains,39 remove obstructions from drainage channels or watercourses,40 
modify existing drains,41 and take private land for drainage purposes (with 
compensation payable).42 
TAs, as the building consent authority for their district, have responsibilities 
under the Building Act 2004.43 A building consent may not be granted if the 
land is or is likely to be subject to flooding.44 A building consent may 
nevertheless be granted but the natural hazard risk will be recorded on the 
certificate of title.45 Other conditions may be placed on construction so as to 
comply with the Act and clause E1 (Surface Water) of the Building Code. 
III Council Liability at Common Law 
Council work on flood protection is not always successful, and has led to 
flooding, damaging homes and businesses. An aggrieved party may seek 
legal redress, tort being an option. If so, a plaintiff must first determine the 
appropriate defendant. This will generally be either a RC or TA. An in-
                                                            
36  Resource Management Act 1991, s 72. 
37  Section 73. 
38  Local Government Act 1974, ss 446–517. 
39  Section 459. 
40  Section 511. 
41  Section 509. 
42  Public Works Act 1981, Part 2. 
43  Building Act 2004, s 212. 
44  Section 71. 
45  Sections 72–74. 
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depth analysis of who is specifically responsible for what for the purposes 
of litigation is beyond the scope of this essay.46 
The second consideration is the appropriate cause of action. This essay 
principally outlines the torts of private nuisance and negligence. Other 
claims may be available (such as public nuisance,47 or breach of statutory 
duty48), but are not examined here.49 
The third factor is to determine in what capacity the defendant may be held 
liable. The defendant may be directly liable for its wrongs, liable for the 
wrongs of its agents/employees (vicariously liable),50 or liable on the basis 
that it owed a non-delegable duty to the plaintiff. This essay amalgamates 
direct and vicarious liability as a council will likely accept liability in either 
case, but addresses non-delegable duties separately. 
Councils are immune from liability in certain circumstances under both 
statute and common law. These immunities generally will not apply where 
there has been bad faith or gross negligence,51 or some other standard 
stipulated in the statute. However, there is no blanket immunity for councils 
in respect of all wrongs. This essay does not seek to discuss the current 
extent of local authority immunity except where relevant.52 
A Causes of Action 
1 Private nuisance 
Broadly speaking, nuisance is an “unreasonable interference with a person’s 
right to the use or enjoyment of an interest in land.”53 While nuisance 
typically concerns on-going or intermittent interferences rather than isolated 
                                                            
46  See John McSweeny, above n 11, at 31–37 for a summary of provisions in flood 
related statutes. 
47  Stephen Todd The Law of Torts in New Zealand (6th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2013) at 560–569. 
48  In the context of local authorities see Kenneth Palmer Local Authorities Law in 
New Zealand (Brookers, Wellington, 2012) at 153. 
49  See John McSweeny, above n 11, at 31–37 for a summary of provisions in flood 
related statutes. 
50  See Kenneth Palmer, above n 48, at 119. 
51  For example Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, s 110. 
52  For further details on council immunity see Kenneth Palmer, above n 48, at 157. 
53  Stephen Todd, above n 47, at 510. 
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escapes this is not invariably true.54 Instances where isolated escapes have 
given rise to a claim in nuisance include a burst water main,55 a blocked 
drain causing a flood,56 and a gas explosion.57 Furthermore, the remedy of 
an injunction, not available under either Rylands v Fletcher (discussed later) 
or negligence, may be more advantageous to a plaintiff than damages. 
Private nuisance is bifurcated. There are two actionable species: 
interferences which result in “material injury to the property” and those 
causing “sensible personal discomfort”.58 The former requires “material” or 
“substantial”59 damage, not merely “trivial”.60 The latter requires a broad 
analysis of a range of factors including the nature of the locality. Flooding 
would engage both, but the focus here will be on “material injury to 
property”. Once the threshold of unreasonable interference with a relevant 
right is reached liability is strict. 
Two questions need to be considered: firstly, because floods generally do 
not regularly recur in any given area, whether an isolated escape of this sort 
can constitute a nuisance, and secondly whether a council could be liable 
having allowed a nuisance to occur through, for example, having failed to 
unblock drains. 
Sedleigh-Denfield engages both issues.61 The defendant’s land sat on a slope 
above the plaintiff’s. A drain with a culvert had been laid on the plaintiff’s 
property by the local council without the plaintiff’s authority. While the 
defendant had been periodically clearing out the culvert’s mouth, at some 
stage heavy rainfall caused debris to block the pipe. Water then flooded the 
plaintiff’s property. While the defendant had not created the nuisance, the 
issue was whether or not it could be liable for having continued it. The 
House of Lords found that it could. Lord Atkin stated that an occupier who 
                                                            
54  Hamilton v Papakura District Council [2000] 1 NZLR 265 (CA). 
55  Irvine & Co Ltd v Dunedin City Corporation [1939] NZLR 741. 
56  Pemberton v Bright [1960] 1 WLR 436 (CA). 
57  Midwood & Co Ltd v Mayor, Alderman and Citizens of Manchester [1905] 2 KB 
597. 
58  St Helen’s Smelting v Tipping (1865) 11 HLC 642, 11 ER 1483 (HL) at 1486. 
59  Davis v Lethbridge [1976] 1 NZLR 689 (SC) at 697. 
60  Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 683 (QB) at 691. 
61  Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, [1940] All ER 349 (HL). 
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continues a nuisance with knowledge of its existence, having failed to take 
reasonable steps to end it, will be liable for harm caused by that nuisance.62 
The fact that the escape was a one-off event was no barrier to recovery. 
There has been academic criticism of the blurring of intellectual distinctions 
between the rule in Rylands v Fletcher (which typically concerns isolated 
escapes) and nuisance.63 However, several nuisance cases have succeeded 
on this basis,64 the doctrine now well established.  
Pemberton v Bright addresses the second issue as to whether council 
management of drainage works can result in actionable nuisances.65 The 
defendant council widened a bridge, and the culvert below it, by 10 metres. 
For three decades council workers regularly cleared it of debris. Following 
particularly heavy rainfall the culvert became blocked and nearby land 
flooded. The plaintiffs brought an action in nuisance. The Court held that, as 
the defendants had created a “potential nuisance” which became an actual 
nuisance when blocked, the council was liable.66 
Further supporting isolated escapes from drains as “constituting a nuisance” 
Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Rail Co concerned a culvert in a 
stream.67 As part of a children’s playground a concrete paddling pool and 
dam were built at the culvert’s mouth. These works constituted a major 
obstruction to the water flow. During high rainfall the stream flooded and 
damaged the plaintiff’s properties. Lord Findlay, in a passage followed by 
the House of Lords in Sedliegh-Denfield,68 said:69 
 It is the duty of any one who interferes with the course of a stream to see 
that the works which he substitutes for the channel provided by nature are 
                                                            
62  At 360. 
63  Stephen Todd, above n 47, at 529. 
64  For example Charing Cross Electricity Supply Co Ltd v Hydraulic Power Co 
[1914] 3 KB 772 (CA); Spicer v Smee [1946] 1 All ER 489 (KB); Hiap v Lee 
(Cheong Leong and Sons) Brickmakers Ltd v Weng Lok Mining Co Ltd [1974] 2 
MLJ 1 (PC); Pemberton v Bright, above n 56; and Hill v Waimea County Council 
HC Nelson A8/84, 12 March 1987. 
65  Pemberton v Bright, above n 56. 
66  At 442. 
67  Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Rail Co [1917] AC 556 (HL). 
68  Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan, above n 61, at 353. 
69  At 572. 
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adequate to carry off the water brought down even by extraordinary 
rainfall … 
Liability was appropriate because it was a direct result of the obstruction 
created by the defendants. 
The New Zealand courts have followed the UK approach, although no 
plaintiff has had a notable success against a local authority in respect of 
flooding. In Atlas Properties several plaintiffs sued a council after a culvert 
was overwhelmed during a period of exceptional rainfall, the excess spilling 
out and flooding nearby properties and businesses.70 Nuisance was claimed 
but failed. Durie J held that in each of the cases discussed above a particular 
feature of the works resulted in the water’s escape. In Greenock there was a 
dam and pool, and in Pemberton an unprotected culvert with a propensity to 
block existed.71 In Atlas, there had been no interference with the channel of 
water except for the construction of the culvert itself which, importantly, did 
not limit the natural flow of water. 
The courts will thus hold councils liable for one-off escapes caused by 
blocked or restricted drains and culverts followisng heavy rain only where 
the work interferes with the natural flow of water. Furthermore, a council 
may inherit a nuisance if it continues it with knowledge that it has, or may 
cause harm, and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid that harm. This 
applies most appropriately to drains becoming congested. 
Once an actionable nuisance has been established the usual remedy 
restraining the activity is an injunction.72 In the context of widespread 
flooding, which is irregular, damages will generally be appropriate.73 
However, those residents suffering regular flooding in some areas of 
Christchurch since the 2011 earthquakes, for example, might prefer an 
injunction forcing the council to take measures to abate flooding. The terms 
                                                            
70  Atlas Properties Ltd v Kapiti Coast District Council HC Wellington CP172/00 19, 
December 2001. This case was appealed to the Court of Appeal on issues of 
causation in respect of negligence, the outcome unchanged (Atlas Properties Ltd v 
Kapiti Coast District Council CA30/02, 20 June 2002). 
71  At [47]. 
72  Subject to section 16A of the Judicature Act 1908. 
73  For example, the loss of crops as a result of flooding can be recoverable as 
damages (Simpson v Attorney-General [1959] NZLR 546 (SC)). 
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of an injunction vary and are tailored to the circumstances. An injunction 
need not require the defendant to cease an activity altogether, but only to 
bring it within a level which an ordinary person in the plaintiff’s position 
could reasonably be expected to tolerate. 
The rule in Rylands v Fletcher,74 generally regarded as a subset of private 
nuisance,75 may also be available. But, in the context of flooding, has been 
largely unsuccessful,76 with one anomalous exception.77 This is typically 
because flood works are not themselves extra-hazardous in the same way 
that, for example, explosives are.78 
Even so, councils may be able to rely on section 148(1) of the SCRCA 
which provides: 
 No Board shall be liable for injury to any land or other property caused 
without negligence of the Board by the accidental overflowing of any 
watercourse, or by the sudden breaking of any bank, dam, sluice, or 
reservoir made or maintained by the Board. 
Consequently, where a RC (or TA, if that power has been delegated 
pursuant to s 125 of the Act)79 can show that for the purposes of the relevant 
works it was operating as a “catchment board” negligence must be shown 
before liability will follow. Claims in Rylands v Fletcher and nuisance, 
being strict liability, will be excluded unless the physical work fall outside 
those enumerated in the provision. For example, where the works are 
principally for a different purpose from those set out in section 10 (a bridge 
or road is constructed, for example) then the work may instead fall within 
the exercise of powers under the LGAs.80  
                                                            
74  Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 
75  Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264 (HL) at 
304 per Lord Goff. 
76  Atlas Properties Ltd v Kapiti Coast District Council, above n 70; and  Easton 
Agriculture Ltd v Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council [2012] 1 NZLR 120 
(HC). 
77  Green v Hamilton City Council DC Hamilton NP 921/98, 2 March 2000. 
78  See Easton Agriculture Ltd v Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council, above n 76, 
at [118]. See generally Kenneth Palmer, above n 48, at 122. 
79  For example Atlas Properties Ltd v Kapiti Coast District Council, above n 70, at 
[17]. 
80  Local Government Act 2002 and Local Government Act 1974. 
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Section 148(1) “has the statutory consequence of effectively displacing 
other forms of liability, apart from negligence”.81 However, it is not clear 
whether the section rules out a claim in nuisance where the remedy sought is 
an injunction rather than damages. The provision has been narrowly 
interpreted. In Atlas Properties, discussed above, the stopbank was 
intentionally built so that if the culvert was overwhelmed, the excess water 
would flow over the bank, albeit then flooding the plaintiff’s property. 
Curiously, Durie J held that there was no “accidental overflow”, the 
overflow being the intentional result of a floodplan, s 148(1) therefore not 
applying.82 Nevertheless, even if the section does apply, an action in 
negligence may be brought. 
2 Negligence 
The tort of negligence operates where a defendant has been careless in some 
legally relevant way. In particular, it has four main elements: (1) the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a ‘duty of care’; (2) the defendant breached that 
duty of care; (3) the harm suffered by the plaintiff was caused by the 
defendant’s breach; and (4) the harm caused was not too ‘remote’ from the 
breach.83 
(a)  Duty of care 
Whether a duty of care is owed is assessed, firstly, on whether the 
relationship between the parties is sufficiently “proximate”, then analysing 
“policy” arguments, often external to the parties, either militating against or 
enforcing a duty. This part addresses arguments of proximity. The policy of 
council liability will be addressed later. However, when seeking to impose a 
private duty against a public authority exercising its public functions, the 
courts have been hesitant to recognise a duty. This issue is commonly 
referred to as “justiciability” and is relevant to both “proximity” and 
“policy”. 
                                                            
81  Easton Agriculture Ltd v Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council, above n 76, at 
[106]. Note that the case was appealed, but substantive issues discussed here were 
not raised (Easton Agriculture Ltd v Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council 
[2013] NZCA 79 (26 March 2013). 
82  Atlas Properties Ltd v Kapiti Coast District Council, above n 70, at [20]. 
83  Stephen Todd, above n 47, at 147. 
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It is highly unlikely that issues of justiciability will arise where a local 
authority chooses to undertake flood protections and then carries them out 
without reasonable care. For example, if a council decides to provide 
stopbanks to protect against a 1 in 50 year flood, and a 1 in 100 year flood 
occurs, damaging the plaintiff’s property, the claim would likely not 
proceed. The plaintiff would have to allege that the council was negligent in 
its decision to protect only against a lesser flood. On the other hand, if the 
same decision was made and works were carried out carelessly and a 1 in 25 
year flood occurred damaging the plaintiff’s property because the stopbank 
was not built with due care, the harm results from the operation of the 
decision rather than the decision itself. Consequently a claim will 
appropriately lie against the authority. This is commonly referred to as the 
“operational” “policy” distinction,84 although it is more appropriately a 
spectrum than a dichotomy.85 There are two New Zealand cases which 
exemplify the courts’ approach to this type of duty in respect of flooding. 
In Easton Agriculture the Council had levied extensive rates to fund a flood 
management programme, undertaking monitoring and maintenance of the 
works.86 Kós J found that the parties were sufficiently proximate. Firstly, 
the statutory purpose of s 148 (see above) indicates that councils “should be 
liable if they are negligent in the construction or maintenance of 
stopbanks”.87 Secondly, the council specifically undertook the monitoring 
and maintenance of stopbanks, paid for through significant rates.88 It was 
also “wholly foreseeable” that a failure to carefully check the stopbank 
would result in the damage that it did.89 Finally harm resulting from an 
omission to maintain, rather than a positive act of negligence, did not 
prohibit a duty being owed.90 
                                                            
84  Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 (HL). 
85  See generally Kenneth Palmer, above n 48, at 142 and Andrew Butler, Dean 
Knight and Geoff McLay “Liability of Local Authorities” (paper presented to the 
New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, June 2005) at 45–51. 
86  Easton Agriculture Ltd v Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council, above n 76. 
87  At [132]. 
88  At [133]. 
89  At [146]. 
90  At [139], citing Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645 (PC); Landon v Rutherford 
[1951] NZLR 975 (HC); and Leaky v National Trust [1980] QB 485 (CA). 
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This can be contrasted with the approach taken in Atlas Properties where it 
was found that s 148(1) did not apply, and therefore different considerations 
arose. There, Durie J stated that the Council must have been assumed to 
have taken into consideration “the suitability of the land … having regard to 
the prospect of inundation.”91 Before granting an application for 
subdivision, the Council was required to consider the risk of inundation.92 
The Council granted the subdivision requiring earthworks to be undertaken. 
Later on permits for construction on the land were granted, again, requiring 
the Council to be satisfied of the land’s security from flooding. On these 
bases the exercise of statutory powers made the parties sufficiently 
proximate. 
These two cases illustrate different ways of finding that the relevant 
councils owed a duty of care. In summary, many considerations lead to a 
council owing a duty. Firstly, most significant building work requires 
approval by a council after having considered the land’s susceptibility to 
flooding. Secondly, councils levy rates from the public in order to fund 
flood protection measure. Thirdly, it is reasonably foreseeable that, if a 
council carelessly undertakes its statutory obligations to protect against 
flooding, then damage by flooding may occur. These cases illustrate that the 
courts are willing to impose a duty, and overcome issues of justiciability.93 
Yet, whether a duty is owed in any given case will depend on its facts. 
   (b)  Breach, causation, and remoteness 
As these enquiries tend to be factual analyses rather than legal, an attempt to 
canvass the multitude of scenarios in which a local authority may have 
breached a duty in any given situation is unnecessary. However, the greatest 
difficulty plaintiffs appear to have in negligence claims of this nature is 
proving that the authority’s breach of its duty caused the damage.94 It is 
                                                            
91  Atlas Properties Ltd v Kapiti Coast District Council, above n 70, at [47]. 
92  Now the Resource Management Act 1991, s 106. 
93  For a longer discussion on the source of the duty of care owed by a local authority, 
see Butler, Knight and McLay, above n 85, at 39–42. 
94  Both Easton Agriculture Ltd v Manawatu-Regional Council above n 76, and Atlas 
Properties Ltd v Kapiti Coast District Council above n 70 were upheld on appeal 
as to the Judges’ findings that there was no causation (Easton Agriculture Ltd v 
Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council [2013] NZCA 79 (26 March 2013) and 
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typically argued that, even if the authority had been careful, the same 
damage by flooding would have occurred.95 
B Non-delegable Duties 
As discussed, local authorities can be liable for flooding damage for their 
own torts and those of their employees (through vicarious liability). 
However, it is less clear whether local authorities owe a so-called “non-
delegable duty of care”, a developing area of the law. Despite the 
phraseology “duty of care”, typically associated with the tort of negligence, 
the doctrine applies more broadly. Similarly to vicarious liability, non-
delegable duties seek to impose liability for another’s torts, not just 
negligence.  
Where a wrong is committed by an employee vicarious liability will 
typically be the appropriate path to find the employer liable.96 However, 
where a defendant has contracted out for work to be done, they are usually 
entitled to leave that contractor unsupervised.97 This is where the courts 
distinguish between a contract of service (an employee) and a contract for 
services (a contractor).98 
The doctrine of non-delegable duties tends to operate where the defendant is 
in a position of control, the defendant engages another to do work, that work 
poses some “special danger”, and the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable or is 
dependent on the defendant.99 Specifically in the context of local authorities 
the LGA stipulates that:100 
 … no delegation relieves the local authority … of the liability or legal 
responsibility to perform or ensure performance of any function or duty. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Atlas Properties Ltd v Kapiti Coast District Council CA30/02, 20 June 2002 
respectively). 
95  Atlas Properties Ltd v Kapiti Coast District Council, above n 70, at [7]. See also 
Powrie v Nelson City Corporation p1976] 2 NZLR 247; Gazley v Lower Hutt City 
Council HC Wellington CP 460-90, 1 April and more generally Butler, Knight and 
McLay, above n 85, at 130–132.  
96  See generally Stephen Todd, above n 47, at 1143–1189. 
97  Cashfield House Ltd v David & Heather Sinclair Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 452 (HC) at 
466. 
98  Woodland v Swimming Teacher Association [2013] UKSC 66, [2014] AC 537 at 
[15]. 
99  Stephen Todd, above n 47, at 413. 
100  Local Government Act 2002, Schedule 7, cl 32(7), 
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1 “Inherently dangerous” activities 
The orthodox position has been modified by a recent UK Supreme Court 
decision, Woodland v Swimming Teacher Association.101  There, the 
appellant was a student of a local school which provided swimming lessons 
to students. The school sought an independent contractor to undertake these 
lessons. At some stage during the lesson, the appellant lost consciousness 
under water, was resuscitated, but suffered a serious hypoxic brain injury. It 
was accepted that the school could not be vicariously liable as the 
swimming instructors were “truly independent contractors”.102 The 
appellant sought to recover against the school on the basis that it owed her a 
non-delegable duty of care. The school countered by claiming that, as the 
instruction was given by an independent contractor, the contractor alone 
remained liable, not the school. 
Lord Sumption, delivering the judgment of the majority,103 noted two 
categories of non-delegable duty.104 The first of these categories (although 
not relevant to that case),105 endorsed in New Zealand,106 operates where the 
defendant employs a contractor to perform a function which is inherently 
dangerous. This category is typically reserved for “especially hazardous 
activities”, itself split into the “highway” cases, and the more general “extra 
hazardous” cases.107 While some floodworks also constitute roads (culverts 
under bridges, for example) the highway cases will not be canvassed here as 
they occupy a very specific place within the “especially hazardous” 
category.108 The more general “extra hazardous” category will be the focus 
of this part. 
                                                            
101  Woodland v Swimming Teacher Association, above n 98. 
102  At [3]. 
103  With whom Lady Hale agreed but wrote a separate judgment. 
104  At [6]. 
105  At [6]. 
106  Stephen Todd, above n 47, at 1179. 
107  Honeywill and Stein Ltd v Larkin Brothers (London’s Commercial Photographers 
Ltd) [1934] 1 KB 191 (CA). 
108  For a comprehensive discussion of the “highway” cases see Salsbury v Woodland 
[1970] 1 QB 324 (CA), and in the New Zealand context McLellan v New Zealand 
Roads Ltd [1927] NZLR 172 (SC); Meurs v Taieri County [1954] NZLR 1080. 
17 
 
In the Australian decision Burnie Port Authority v General Jones,109 the 
defendant hired contractors to carry out welding work, aware that highly 
inflammable substances were stored where the work was to be carried out. 
A fire eventuated, spreading to a neighbour. The defendant could not escape 
liability, having undertaken an exceptionally dangerous activity, and 
therefore owed a non-delegable duty. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court in Burnie drew on an older New 
Zealand case, Black v Christchurch Finance.110 There, a contractor 
negligently lit a fire to burn off bush on the defendant’s land, contrary to the 
terms of the contract. The fire spread to the plaintiff’s land. The defendant 
was liable on the basis that the activity was so dangerous that the defendant 
had a duty to “use all reasonable precautions”. The scope of non-delegable 
duties was further extended in New Zealand in Mt Albert Borough Council v 
Johnson.111 A development company had built houses on subdivided land. 
The company was held to be under a non-delegable duty to ensure that 
proper care and skill was exercised in the houses’ construction. The Court 
provided little guidance as to why this was so other than that the buildings 
were intended to “house people for many years”.112  
Many of the cases which have held non-delegable duties to exist have 
featured the statutory empowerment of a body to undertake a task in 
circumstances where a plaintiff could not be reasonably expected to 
undertake that duty or function themselves.113 Therefore, because local 
authorities are empowered by statute to undertake the construction of flood 
works, a task most people cannot conduct themselves, a non-delegable duty 
may be appropriate. 
However, on balance it cannot be convincingly argued that the construction 
of flood works falls within this “extra hazardous” category. Flood works 
(once constructed) do not possess the same kind of dangers as explosives or 
                                                            
109  Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520 (HCA). 
110  Black v Christchurch Finance Co Ltd [1894] AC 48, (1893) NZPCC 448. 
111  Mt Albert Borough Council v Johnson [1979] 2 NZLR 234 (CA). 
112  At 240. 
113  For example foster care in S v Attorney-General [2003] NZCA 149, [2003] 3 
NZLR 450. 
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inflammable materials.114 In the context of whether stopbanks are “non-
natural” under Rylands v Fletcher, it has been acknowledged that stopbanks 
and other flood works, do not themselves engage hazards but instead seek to 
minimise a risk that natural causes have already created.115 Consequently, it 
would be counter-intuitive to consider the works as sufficiently hazardous in 
themselves such that a non-delegable duty should be owed. While Mt Albert 
leans in favour of such a duty, flood works also being intended to exist for 
some time to protect people, the reasoning is not sustainable past Woodland 
and Burnie. Mt Albert should therefore no longer be followed in New 
Zealand. 
2 Caring relationships 
The second category of duty noted by Lord Sumption in Woodland – 
relevant to that case – typically concerns caring relationships and has three 
principal features. Firstly, the duty arises from “an antecedent relationship” 
between the parties. Secondly, the duty is a positive one to protect the 
plaintiff and not merely to avoid causing harm. Thirdly, the duty is “by 
virtue of that relationship personal to the defendant.”116 
Liability on the basis of a non-delegable duty of this sort has been held 
appropriate in a series of clearly delineated areas including employer 
employee relationships,117 hospital care,118 and the care of children in 
schools.119 These cases feature a familiar reiteration of the rubrics of 
control, assumption of responsibility, and vulnerability importing a degree 
                                                            
114  For example, The Greater Wellington Regional Council described stopbank as 
“continuous mounds of earth built near rivers” (Greater Wellington Regional 
Council “Stopbanks and flood ways” (2014) Greater Wellington Regional Council 
< www.gw.govt.nz/Stopbanks-and-flood-ways>). 
115  Easton Agriculture Ltd v Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council, above n 76, at 
[118]. 
116  Woodland v Swimming Teacher Association, above n 98, at [7]. 
117  Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57 (HL); McDermid v Nash 
Dredging and Reclamation Co Ltd [1987] AC 906 (HL); and Kondis v State 
Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672 (HCA) at 29–33. 
118  Gold v Essex County Council [1942] 2 KB 293; Cassidy v Ministry of Health 
[1951] 2 KB 343; and X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 
(HL) at 740. 
119  Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR (HCA) 258. 
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of risk associated with the operation.120 Control under this category of non-
delegable duty means control over the claimant for the purpose of 
performing a function rather than control over the physical environment in 
which the harm occurs.121 
Lord Sumption then stated five general factors, three of which can be 
applied to flooding.122 Firstly, the plaintiff is “especially vulnerable” to the 
defendant. Secondly, there is a relationship of actual custody or care from 
which an assumption of responsibility can be imputed to the defendant. 
Thirdly, the plaintiff has no control over how the obligation is performed. 
There are some similarities between this type of duty and flooding 
protection. However, these do not appear to be sufficient to bring the 
council within the ambit of the doctrine for the purpose of protecting the 
community at large from flooding. Factors pointing in favour of there being 
such a duty include the relevant statutory empowerment to undertake flood 
protection, and provisions in the LGA which state that an authority will 
remain liable even in the event of delegation.123 Additionally, protection 
from floods is difficult, and for individuals to undertake, often impossible. 
Consequently, a local authority is far better placed to address the issue. 
Furthermore, many populated areas of New Zealand are at a high risk of 
being flooded. Consequently, there may be said to be a certain ‘risk’ around 
this type of work in respect of which it is more appropriate to impose a non-
delegable duty. 
However, many factors run contrary to such a duty. Firstly, while many who 
live in flood prone areas may be vulnerable to flooding, they are not 
“especially vulnerable” in the same sense that a prisoner, patient, or child is 
vulnerable to risk created by the circumstance of their care arrangements. 
Flood works do not engage hazards but instead mitigate them. Secondly, the 
harm under this type of duty has always been in respect of personal injury 
                                                            
120  For a clear example see New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511 (HCA). 
The case concerned a sexual abuse at a school. 
121  Woodland v Swimming Teacher Association, above n 98, at [24]. Compare A 
(Child) v Ministry of Defence [2005] QB 183. 
122  At [23]. 
123  Local Government Act 2002, Schedule 7, cl 32(7). 
20 
 
rather than property damage.124 Thirdly, there is no “antecedent 
relationship” such that the council has actual custody over the properties of 
general homeowners in the same way that a school has custody over 
children in its care. Consequently, the necessary assumption of a positive 
duty to protect the plaintiff’s property cannot be imputed.125 Fourthly, a 
plaintiff, through community consultation, may have a say in how the 
council goes about performing its flood protection obligations. As Easton 
Agriculture illustrates, the extraction of rates can bring with it public 
consultation. 
In conclusion, the differences between the line of cases under this category 
of non-delegable duty and the nature of flood damage (in particular, the 
focus on the person rather than property) may be an insurmountable hurdle 
despite legislative indications to the contrary.126 Consequently, even if the 
New Zealand courts adopt Woodland, councils under neither category are 
likely to owe a non-delegable duty to members of the general public for 
failed flood works. 
IV Should Councils be Liable? 
Floods will continue to occur. These floods will cause damage and someone 
will pay for that damage. While, in the right circumstances, a local authority 
can be liable for flood damage, is it appropriate that they should? In reality, 
are they covered by other policies such as insurance? Should liability be 
strict, or merely fault based? This discussion involves three key players: 
residents and businesses who suffer harm, councils, and the insurance 
industry. The ‘big picture’ issue is whether individual members of the 
community are to bear the cost themselves (individual liability), or whether 
councils should protect individuals by distributing that loss through rates 
(communal/council liability). The author argues that an amalgam of the two 
models is preferable, while recognising that the distinction may be artificial 
                                                            
124  While personal injury may not be an impossible result, property is the focus in 
New Zealand. 
125  However, this may be different where a council has condemned a property until a 
problem (such as flooding) has been remedied, creating a pseudo-physical custody 
of the property. For example, the red zoning of large areas of property in 
Christchurch following the Canterbury earthquakes may suffice. 
126  Local Government Act 2002, Schedule 7, cl 32(7). 
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in light of insurance practices and the potentially inhibitive cost of litigation. 
An analysis of loss spreading will inevitably require an elucidation of some 
economic concepts. A brief discussion about current insurance practices is 
also necessary. Policy arguments below may also be applicable as to 
whether a duty of care is “fair, just and reasonable”127 for the purposes of a 
negligence claim. 
A Homeowner and Local Authority Insurance 
1 Homeowners 
The primary means of protecting homes and their contents is through private 
insurance policies. Few home insurance policies exclude flood damage.128 
The Earthquake Commission (EQC), a Crown entity, also provides national 
insurance called EQCover. EQCover insures residential buildings against 
natural disasters including storms and flooding. EQCover is paid from the 
Natural Disaster Fund (the Fund) under the Earthquake Commission Act 
1993. 
EQCover is automatic for those who have private insurance policies for 
their home and/or contents that includes fire damage.  Cover for “storm or 
flood” damage is more limited than other natural disasters. Claims may be 
made only in respect of “residential land”,129 not contents. 
A Levy included in insurance premiums paid by customers is paid to EQC. 
EQCover pays a maximum of $100,000 for damage to “residential 
buildings”, the balance paid by insurance companies under the customer’s 
policy. An insurance company could seek to recover the balance against a 
local authority for damage resulting from an authority’s negligent safeguard. 
The Insurance Council of New Zealand is unaware if a claim has been 
                                                            
127  Couch v Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45, [2008] 3 NZLR 725 [No 1] at 52. 
128  Email from Terry Jordan (Operations Manager for the Insurance Council of New 
Zealand) to Sean Brennan regarding the percentage of homeowners with insurance 
cover for flooding (30 June 2014). However, those buildings subject to a section 
74 notice under the Building Act 1991 are unlikely to be covered. 
129  Earthquake Commission Act 1993, s 2. 
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brought against a local council for flooding.130 However, insurers potentially 
can recover costs for loses resulting from the negligence of others. 
2 Councils 
Councils insure their own assets against flood damage in a range of ways, 
for example through the Local Authority Protection Programme Disaster 
Fund131 and through private insurance policies. Liability insurance may be 
purchased in respect of damage caused by the council to private individuals. 
B Where Should Loss Fall? 
As discussed above, this essay addresses individual and communal/council 
liability. A system of individual liability would require that councils either 
be completely immune from actions or be liable only in limited 
circumstances, for example negligence.132 Both options would require 
legislative action. Individuals would be expected to absorb the loss 
themselves, a majority of whom will have home insurance. As a general rule 
insurance companies charge more over time in accumulative premiums than 
the value of what they pay out, otherwise there would be no market for 
insurance (leaving aside reinsurance). Consequently the community as a 
whole will pay more to insurance companies than the total value of losses 
from flooding, except in extreme events where insurers cannot afford to pay 
out all claims.133 Despite this, people are generally risk averse. When faced 
with the choice between a small certain loss and a higher but uncertain loss 
of equal value, people prefer the certain outcome.134 
While most homeowners do have home insurance which covers flood 
damage (further protected by EQCover) and can therefore pass that loss on 
to insurance companies, those who do not have insurance may be greatly 
                                                            
130  Interview with ICNZ representative, Senior Representative (Sean Brennan, The 
Insurance Industry and Flooding, 8 August 2014). 
131  LAPP “About LAPP: Background & History” (2013) LAPP: Local Authority 
Protection Programme <www.lappfund.co.nz>. 
132  As reflected in s 148(1) of the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941. 
133  This is exemplified by the cost to the LAPP fund of the Canterbury earthquakes. 
See The Press “Disputes over insurance payout” (8 May 2014) Stuff 
<www.stuff.co.nz/national/10020889>. 
134  Michael Faure Tort Law and Economics (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (UK), 2009) 
vol 1 at 377. 
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burdened. The average homeowner’s most valuable asset, their home and 
land, may be prohibitively expensive to rebuild. This is a major downfall of 
individual liability. Additionally, if councils were never liable for damage, 
they may be less motivated to carefully undertake flood protection. 
Individual liability is nevertheless advantageous for a number of reasons, 
apparent when examining the council liability model. If councils are to be 
liable they will pass that loss back to the public at large through rates. The 
income from rates can then be applied in one of two ways. A general fund 
may be created into which those rates are paid and from which money can 
be drawn to settle claims against the council. Alternatively it could be used 
to purchase liability insurance. Regardless of how the money is used, this 
essay refers to both types of scheme, interchangeably, as a ‘rates based’ 
insurance scheme. Therefore where councils have this protection they will 
be largely unaffected. Nevertheless, if councils were to be liable the price of 
home insurance in respect of flooding should decrease as insurance 
companies would be able to pursue claims against councils more readily. 
However, home and business owners with private insurance will lose out. 
They will not only be paying insurance premiums privately in excess of the 
value of the overall loss, but will also be funding the council’s insurance. 
These rates are unlikely to be popular among homeowners who already have 
insurance, infringing on a homeowner’s autonomy to insure how they wish, 
if at all. In conclusion, the individual liability model would be economically 
efficient, but may be unduly harsh on those who cannot afford to insure 
their homes. 
C Loss Spreading 
Nevertheless, should the council liability model be adopted, a system of loss 
distribution would have to exist. While there are three specific rating 
systems, these are beyond the scope of this essay.135 Instead, three different 
forms of loss spreading will be discussed: a no-fault ACC-type scheme (not 
dissimilar to, but going further than EQCover), strict liability, and fault 
                                                            
135  See Kenneth Palmer, above n 48, at 481 for a comprehensive discussion on the 
various rating systems. 
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based liability. Realistically, the current system is an amalgam of all three. 
As shown above, local authorities can be liable for their torts, including the 
strict liability nuisance and Rylands torts, with EQCover operating where 
the owner has the necessary insurance. However, in some circumstances 
(for example, an authority which falls within s 148(1) of the SACRA) then 
an authority may only be liable in respect of its negligence. While total 
immunity from civil actions in this context can be viewed as a type of loss 
spreading, this would equate to the individual liability model above and is 
not discussed here. 
1 No-fault scheme 
The revolutionary ‘Woodhouse Report’136 paved the way for the no fault 
ACC scheme in respect of personal injury: “Injury, not Cause, is the 
Issue”.137 The government would cover the cost of personal injuries and 
proceedings for personal injury were barred.138 The report states five 
fundamental principles under which the scheme is to operate:139 community 
responsibility, comprehensive entitlement, complete rehabilitation, “real 
compensation”, and administrative efficiency. 
This scheme bears some similarities with EQCover which involves the 
government remedying damage caused by natural disasters without being 
concerned whether anyone was at fault for that loss.140 This could be seen as 
a property-based parallel to “rehabilitation” under ACC. 
However, the differences are significant. EQCover is not indiscriminate. 
Only those who have taken out the necessary insurance will receive 
EQCover pay-outs, unlike ACC which pays out irrespective of insurance. 
Furthermore, EQCover will only extend up to a certain dollar value, as 
                                                            
136  New Zealand Royal Commission of Enquiry into Compensation for Personal 
Injury Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry (Government Printer, Wellington, 1967) (The Woodhouse 
Report). 
137  At [4]. 
138  Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 317. However, s 319 still permits actions for 
exemplary damages. 
139  The Woodhouse Report, above n 136, at [55]–[63]. 
140  Damage by natural disaster in most circumstances will not be anyone’s ‘fault’. 
However, this essay has demonstrated that, for example, local authorities can still 
be liable for such damage in some circumstances. 
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discussed above. Consequently, neither the third nor fourth Woodhouse 
principles could be said to be met in every pay-out. While the limited 
coverage will be sufficient in some circumstances, in others it may be 
grossly inadequate.  
Should EQCover be extended to occupy a position analogous to ACC? The 
answer must be ‘no’, unless the source of funding is significantly altered. 
ACC pays those who suffer injuries, and ACC is in turn funded through a 
variety of levies. Generally people are levied irrespective of risk. 
Because EQCover is funded through a portion of insurance premiums paid 
by insurance companies, in order to function like ACC EQC would have to 
draw costs from the homeowners more directly. Alternatively, if EQC 
required payments from local authorities based on the value of property 
within their geographical ambit then the authority could then charge rates 
from homeowners who would benefit from that protection. 
Additionally, it may also be important to consider the relevant risk to a 
homeowner of flooding, although this is less emphasised in the ACC 
scheme. Those living in flood prone areas, being more likely to benefit from 
rates-based insurance, ought to pay more than those less likely to suffer 
flooding damage. Indeed, as was the case in Easton Agriculture, the 
stopbank was built using funds specifically levied from those at risk of 
inundation. Rate gathering like this would reflect the pragmatic 
egalitarianism of the Woodhouse Report, but depart somewhat from ACC’s 
source of funding.141 A risk based assessment may be more favourably 
viewed by those at a lesser risk of flooding. Realistically these rates would 
constitute a compensation scheme rather than a liability model. 
A fundamental presupposition of the ACC scheme is that there was a 
significant problem with the previous system: one’s ability to recover was a 
“lottery” based upon the few occasions where that harm was caused through 
an actionable tort or where compensation was available under the piecemeal 
                                                            
141  See also Tsachi Keren-Paz Torts, Egalitarianism and Distribute Justice (Ashgate, 
Burlington (USA), 2007) at 7. 
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compensatory legislation of the time.142 This factor along with the 
Woodhouse Report principles indicated a clear public good in having the 
public at large foot the bill. Does flooding fit this mould, though? Clearly 
flooding can cripple communities financially. However, to say that there is a 
significant problem with the current approach necessitating such significant 
reform would be ambitious. Whether a person is covered is less a lottery and 
more a calculated decision: “do I buy insurance and receive the associated 
benefit from EQCover, or do I save those premiums hoping that I can cover 
any cost I may have, and rely on possibly bringing a claim against an 
authority?” If a no-fault scheme were adopted, as above, those who do buy 
insurance may be required to indirectly foot an additional insurance bill for 
those who have not privately insured. Consequently, the status quo in 
respect of insurance should remain. The more relevant question, therefore, is 
to what extent authorities should be liable for flooding: strictly, or only in 
the presence of fault?  
2 Strict liability 
A strict liability system could take numerous different forms, resulting in 
councils being strictly liable as soon as certain criteria are met. In terms of 
civil liability, this would mean that as soon as the strict liability torts are 
established (i.e. nuisance and Rylands as discussed above) a council could 
not escape liability on the basis that it had not been negligent. Such a 
scheme would be by no means the first of its kind in New Zealand. For 
example the Maritime Transport Act 1994 imposes strict civil liability on 
ship owners for marine pollution discharged or which has otherwise escaped 
from their ships.143 A strict statutory liability model may also allow for the 
addition of a non-delegable duty in respect of flood works. This would have 
the benefit that a plaintiff would be able to recover against a council even 
where a contractor is insolvent. In respect of flooding, this model would 
have to be effected through legislation as the current system already 
                                                            
142  The Woodhouse Report, above n 136, at [1]. 
143  Part 25. There are specific defences to liability under s 348. 
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excludes strict liability in certain circumstances,144 the courts having limited 
scope to extend liability. 
3  Fault based liability 
A fault based liability system, in contrast, would hold an authority liable 
only in circumstances where the relevant harm was caused by its 
negligence. Authorities would essentially be immune from actions in respect 
of flood damage under the torts of nuisance and Rylands. This model, also, 
would require statutory reform as it is clear from and consistent with the 
case law to maintain the strict liability torts in appropriate circumstances. 
New Zealand’s ‘defective building’ line of cases offers precedent for the 
courts passing on potentially widespread costs to local authorities in relation 
to damage to both residential and commercial buildings under a negligence 
standard. While these cases deal with whether a duty of care is owed (which 
has been demonstrated here in respect of flood works) the cases provide a 
useful insight into how the courts deal with issues of loss spreading in 
relation to local authorities. 
In Sunset Terraces the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a 
territorial authority owed a duty of care to a building owner in carrying out 
its statutory responsibilities of inspection and approval of construction for 
residential purposes.145 A finding against the Council would result in 
councils potentially paying significant sums to remedy the so-called ‘leaky 
building syndrome’. The Court found that such a duty existed. Then, in 
Spencer on Byron,146 the Supreme Court considered whether that duty might 
extend to the owners of buildings not for wholly residential purposes. 
Again, the majority held that such a duty existed.147 In that case, the issue 
was raised that a finding in favour of the plaintiff building owner would 
have the result of passing potentially large losses on to rate payers.  
                                                            
144  For example, s 148(1) of the Soil Conversation and Rivers Control Act 1941. 
145  North Shore City council v Body Corporate 188529 [2010] NZSC 158, [2011] 2 
NZLR 289 (Sunset Terraces). 
146  Body Corporate No 207624 v North Shore City Council [2012] NZSC 83, [2013] 2 
NZLR 297 (Spencer on Byron). 
147  See generally Rosmary Tobin “Leaky commercial buildings and council liability” 
(2012) 10 NZLJ 333. 
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Chambers J, writing for himself and McGrath J, held that these concerns 
were overstated. Firstly, while recognising that we do not (or did not at the 
time) know the figures involved, the loss would not be passed on to 
ratepayers but instead to the council.148 That cost would then met through 
fees charged for inspection, and liability insurance if available, rates being a 
last resort. While that may be true in respect of building inspection there is 
no separate source of income available to councils in respect of protecting 
against floods. However, in Easton Agriculture the council, through targeted 
rating, gathered funds specifically from land owners who were to benefit 
from the protection.149 Nevertheless, the public at large are not directly 
charged for the building of flood works in the sense that anyone who wishes 
to have a building constructed must pay for the relevant inspections. 
Consequently, the cost of flood protection primarily comes from taxes such 
as rates, rather than fees charged for the construction of works. 
Chambers J also stated that often councils will be sharing the bill of 
remedying defects with those involved in the construction process, while 
acknowledging that in “some cases” those other parties may have gone 
bankrupt or into liquidation.150 Whether this applies in respect of flood 
works depends on whether a council outsources work to contractors (who 
may share liability) or undertakes the work itself (leaving the council solely 
liable). 
A purely fault based liability model would have the disadvantage that claims 
in the absence of any negligence which would have constituted meritorious 
claims between private parties under strict liability torts will not be available 
because they are brought in respect of a public entity. However, in the 
absence of specific immunity provisions liability in negligence is wholly 
consistent with the statutory scheme as discussed above. 
In conclusion, the individual liability model while more economically 
efficient may be unduly harsh on those who cannot afford to insure 
themselves. Alternatively, a council liability model, while resulting in a 
                                                            
148  Spencer on Byron, above n 146, at [203]. 
149  Easton Agriculture Ltd v Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council, above n 76. 
150  At [204]. 
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complex chain of cost distributions, would have the benefit of ensuring that 
more homeowners are protected against loss, but at a greater financial cost 
to the community, depending on the extent of that liability (i.e. strict or fault 
based). Council liability would also benefit both the insurance industry and 
homeowners. Insurance companies would potentially be able to recover, and 
homeowners would have decreased rates of private insurance. On balance, 
which is preferable will turn on whether the moral value of protecting flood 
prone homeowners against loss outweighs the increased financial burden on 
the community as a whole. Ultimately, the distinction between the two 
models is artificial: both homeowners and councils will insure, the total loss 
being spread across the community in either instance. However, 
significantly changing the degree to which councils are liable would be for 
the legislature. The preferable approach is an amalgam of both the 
individual and council liability models: homeowners, where possible ought 
to have insurance, but councils should remain liable, at the very least where 
they have been negligent. Strict liability may, however, be overly onerous 
on councils during catastrophic flooding events. 
IV Conclusion 
Flooding is a significant problem in New Zealand. Its cost is surpassed only 
by the recent Canterbury earthquakes. Councils and communities have a real 
interest in protecting against flooding as best they can, but some of these 
measures will eventually fail, either because natural forces exceed the limits 
of the works, or because of problems with the protections themselves. 
This essay demonstrates that councils can be liable for flooding damage in 
respect of their own torts, but that a non-delegable duty is not owed to 
general members of the public. This may have the effect that where a 
property is uninsured and the contractor who did the work leading to the 
damage is insolvent, the property owner cannot recover. The extent to which 
councils should be liable ultimately falls to whether the moral obligation of 
socialising loss outweighs acknowledging individual responsibility to insure 
one’s own assets. In the author’s view, while councils should remain liable 
at least for harm caused by their negligence, it would be more economically 
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effective for individuals to remain responsible for protecting their assets 
through private insurance policies. 
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